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1 Introduction
Vertical integration of two firms has the potential to increase their economic efficiency by
exploiting synergies in the design, production, and distribution of their goods and services.
At the same time, firms may pursue integration as a strategy not only to create competitive
advantage, but also to engage in anti-competitive behavior. One such case arises when one of
the integrating firms controls access to a bottleneck input, such as access to vital infrastructure
or technology. The integrated firm might use its access to the bottleneck to extend or preserve
its market power in the upstream markets by refusing to provide rival firms in downstream
markets with access to the bottleneck. These firms are said to be foreclosed. While a large
theoretical literature investigates the motives for vertical foreclosure1, empirical evidence of
firms using foreclosure as a business strategy is restricted to a few very particular cases2, not
least because vertical relationships are rarely observed. This not only restricts our ability to
test the theory, but also limits our understanding of the prevalence of foreclosure in reality.
Even less is known about potential strategies to mitigate the effects of being foreclosed.
The empirical prevalence of vertical foreclose is, of course, at least partly determined by
competition law and its enforcement. Most of its forms are regarded as violating competition
laws in a large range of jurisdictions. In the United States the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust
Acts set out limitations to merger activity, and starting with Terminal Railroad Association
v. U.S. (1912) U.S. courts have established a doctrine on foreclosure. Competition authorities
typically issue guidelines on their assessment of vertical mergers to avoid unforeseen restrictions
on mergers. At the same time – or perhaps as a consequence – enforcement of these vertical
merger laws is relatively rare.3 With recent work arguing that concentration and market power
among US firms increased over the course of the last decades4, and the finger being pointed at
regulatory authorities5, one is led to ask: is enforcement lax, or is actual foreclosure just very
rare? What are the factors determining the prevalence of vertical foreclosure, and how severe
are the consequences? How can firms threatened by foreclosure mitigate its impact?
This paper examines the occurrence of vertical foreclosure across a range of industries and
countries. We exploit a novel panel dataset on vertical relationships — the network structure of
production — between large firms, both in the U.S. and abroad. These data allow us to study
whether buyer-seller relationships break following vertical mergers and acquisitions. We show
that the breaking of a buyer-seller relationship in response to the supplier vertically integrating
downstream is more likely when the downstream merging firm is a competitor of the buyer —
but not when the downstream merging firm is not a competitor of the buyer. Consistent with
1See Rey and Tirole (2007) for an overview. The classic references are Hart and Tirole (1990) and Ordover
et al. (1990).
2Recent examples include Asker (2016) for the Chicago beer market and Crawford et al. (2018) for the US
cable TV industry. Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Slade (2019) survey this literature.
3Salop and Culley (2015) find only 46 vertical enforcement actions in the US over the period 1994–2013.
4De Loecker et al. (2018) estimate a rise in average US markups using Compustat and US Census data;
Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2017) document rising Herfindahl concentration indices in US industries, and Barkai
(2016) documents a rise in the profit share of US non-financial corporations.
5See Gutierrez and Philippon (2018) and The Economist (2018)
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theories of vertical foreclosure, the former break probability is even higher when there is little
competition in the upstream industry. The increased probability of links breaking cannot be
explained by common industry-level (or industry-pair-level) shocks to merger activity or the
break probability. We find this increased break probability in response to both domestic and
cross-border mergers. Similarly, domestic and cross-border relationships are equally likely to
break in response to such vertical mergers.
The correlation we find does not immediately imply that vertical market foreclosure is
taking place in the population of firms and relationships that we study. Causality could run
in the opposite direction: vertical integration could be the response to relationships breaking,
or to the threat thereof. Alternatively, both integration and links breaking could be caused by
unobserved shocks. Finally, the links breaking might not be the the consequence of foreclosure,
but might be the consequence of the integrating parties being able to produce the final good
at such a low cost that the buyer decides to exit the market (and hence stops purchasing the
input).
A series of additional regressions indicates that these explanations are unlikely to account
for the findings. To see whether our results stem from reverse causality, we follow Edmans et al.
(2012) to construct an instrumental variable for vertical mergers and acquisitions. The variable
captures events where investor capital outflows of mutual funds put large downward pressure
on firms’ stock prices, thereby making the firm more likely to be acquired. The correlation
between vertical integration and links breaking prevails for vertical acquisitions that follow
situations where such fund outflow events put downward pressure on the bottleneck supplier’s
stock price. If the investor capital outflows are unrelated to the performance of the supplier,
these cases are integration events that are unlikely to happen for supply assurance reasons (as,
for example, in Bolton and Whinston (1993)). We find similar results when conditioning on
situations where the suppliers are “healthy” in the sense that they have seen sales increases
prior to integrating.
Moreover, we study events where firms are rumored to vertically integrate or announce an
integration, but end up not integrating. To the extent that these rumored integration events
might be caused by the same unobserved shocks as actual integration events, they make for a
good comparison group. For relationships where suppliers are rumored to vertically integrate,
we do not find a higher hazard rate of links breaking than for the average relationship. We also
do not find the large difference in hazard rates between rumored integration with a competitor
of the buyer versus firms unrelated to the buyer.
To investigate whether strong synergies among merging firms force the downstream com-
petitor out of the market and therefore break the link itself, we study the sales response of firms
whose competitor is vertically integrating but who did not have a prior relationship with the
integrating supplier. We find no statistically significant drop in sales for these firms, suggesting
that strong synergies are unlikely to explain the breaking of vertical relationships in our main
result. This is consistent with the results of Blonigen and Pierce (2016), who find no significant
increases in physical productivity among US plants that undergo a merger or acquisition, but
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an increase in market power as measured by markups.
We then use our production network data to ask whether firms that have a foreclosure
motive are more likely than others to integrate with a given supplier. We say that a firm b has
a foreclosure motive when one of its suppliers also sells to one of b’s competitors. In the sample
of active relationships where the supplier is vertically integrating, such firms b are more likely
to end up being the ones that integrate with the supplier. Again, these results are consistent
with foreclosure motives for integration.
Finally, we study the performance of firms in the wake of their supplier’s integration. Firms
which have a supplier that vertically integrates with one of its competitors experience a tem-
porary decrease in sales. The sales drop is larger for firms that do not have another supplier
from the same industry as the one that is integrating. Diversification of the supplier base is
hence a possible way to mitigate the impact of being foreclosed.
We interpret our results as supporting the view that vertical market foreclosure along the
extensive margin (in the sense that relationships fully break) is occurring in the population of
firms and relationships that we study. These relationships are not representative of the overall
population of buyer-seller relationships in the United States, or among industrialized countries:
the set of firms reporting relationships in our data consists mostly of firms that are either listed
on exchanges or issue traded securities. Those firms are also more likely to report relationships
with important suppliers and customers. Given that the relationships in our sample will be
more likely to be in the spotlight of antitrust authorities, we think that vertical foreclosure may
also be prevalent outside the selected sample that we study.
Our paper relates to three different literatures. The first is the literature that studies
the determinants and effects of mergers and acquisitions, both domestic (Malmendier et al.,
2018, Maksimovic et al., 2013, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004, Gugler et al., 2003,
Shenoy, 2012, Blonigen and Pierce, 2016, Cunningham et al., 2018, Harford et al., 2019) and
international (Blonigen, 1997, Nocke and Yeaple, 2007, Ekholm et al., 2007, Breinlich, 2008,
Guadalupe et al., 2012, Stiebale, 2016). In contrast to most of this literature, we study the
impact not on integrating firms themselves, but on the vertically related ones.6 We also show
that foreclosure considerations — as determined by the structure of the production network —
predict vertical mergers.
The second is the empirical literature on detecting vertical market foreclosure. Waterman
and Weiss (1996), Chipty (2001), and Crawford et al. (2018) (in the cable TV industry) and
Hastings and Gilbert (2005) (in the gasoline retailing industry) find evidence for vertical fore-
closure; Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) (in cement and ready-mixed concrete markets) and
Asker (2016) (in the beer industry) find no vertical foreclosure in their respective industries. In
contrast to this literature, we study a range of industries, which not only broadens the scope
of statements that we can make, but also allows for comparisons across industries by their
degree of competitiveness. We draw from data on vertical and competitor relationships, which
ties our hands on the definition of markets and vertical integration. The drawback is that our
6Recent exceptions are Gugler and Szu¨cs (2016) and Stiebale and Szu¨cs (2017), who study the impact of
mergers on horizontally related firms.
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data prevents us from studying prices or markups, and therefore consumer welfare. Instead, we
look at the supplier network of potentially foreclosed firms, and how the relationship between
integration and links breaking varies with market structure in the upstream market.
Finally, our paper also relates to the growing literature on the importance of firm’s position
in the production network for its performance and exposure to shocks (Barrot and Sauvagnat,
2016, Giroud and Mueller, 2017, Bernard et al., 2017, Carvalho et al., 2016, Boehm et al., 2015,
Tintelnot et al., 2018, Kikkawa et al., 2018). Alfaro et al. (2016) study the relationship between
prices and vertical integration across many industries. Related to our work, Bernard and Dhin-
gra (2015) find increased integration and foreclosure following the 2012 Free Trade Agreement
between Colombia and the United States. Our paper shows how the network matters through
the strategic incentives of horizontally related firms, and for how the production network itself
is shaped by those incentives. We also introduce a new dataset on buyer-seller connections in
the U.S. and abroad and document its properties.
The next section describes the data; Sections 3 and 4 present the econometric evidence.
2 Data
We combine three different datasets for our empirical analysis: a dataset describing supply
chain and competitor networks, a dataset of mergers and acquisitions, and data on firm sales
and employment. The first dataset is FactSet Revere, a panel of almost 900,000 vertical and
horizontal relationships of large US and foreign firms. It describes the supplier, customer,
and competitor relationships as well as partnerships of a set of large (mostly publicly listed
or security-issuing) firms from the US and abroad (we call these companies the “covered”
companies). Each relationship is coded with a relationship type, the identity of the firms, and
a start and end date. The data vendor collects this information annually through the covered
companies’ public filings, investor presentations, websites and corporate actions, and through
press releases and news reports. Since the relationship data is the main content of the dataset,
its coverage is much broader than supplier data in Compustat or Bloomberg. While the data
coverage is specifically geared towards large firms, many small and non-listed firms nevertheless
show up in relationships with large firms, hence our overall network is much larger than the
set of listed firms. Coverage varies by country; data for covered North American companies
is available from 2003 to present; Revere starts to cover publicly listed and security-issuing
companies from industrialized and major emerging economies (including Europe and China)
from around 2007.7 To the extent of our knowledge, our paper is the first one in the economics
literature to use this dataset, so we show summary statistics in more detail than we otherwise
would.
FactSet Revere contains thirteen different types of relationships (see Appendix A.1 for
more details). We aggregate these relationship types into two networks: a directed network of
buyer-supplier relationships (from supplier and customer relationships, as well as distribution,
7See Appendix A for details on coverage by country and year.
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production, marketing, and licensing relationships) and an undirected network of competitors.
Moreover, we annualize the relationship data: A relation of any kind is counted as active in a
given calendar year if there is at least one day between start date and end date of the relation
that falls into that calendar year. The result is a panel of relations that is identified by source
company, target company and year.8
Table I—: Descriptive statistics for the firm network
Full Sample Sample of buyers
Mean SD Max Mean SD Max
# Customers 2.13 8.28 533 3.37 10.72 533
# Suppliers 2.13 10.20 980 3.85 13.48 980
# Competitors 2.16 7.73 381 3.48 10.13 381
Share of domestic customers 0.49 0.45 1 0.48 0.42 1
Share of domestic suppliers 0.50 0.45 1 0.50 0.45 1
Share of domestic competitors 0.46 0.45 1 0.46 0.43 1
Obs. per firm (years) 3.97 4.30 14 6.24 4.28 14
Log Sales 12.00 2.81 20 12.70 2.62 20
Log Employment 6.27 2.56 15 6.90 2.46 15
Firms 180,192 80,287
Note: Summary statistics for the number of links in the firm network (2003-2016). The left columns summarize
the full set of firms in the database, the right columns only those firms that have at least one supplier in the
database. We count relations as domestic when both firms are headquartered in the same country. “Observations
per firms” summarizes the coverage length of firms. Sales and employment data come from Compustat, Orbis
and FactSet Fundamentals. Note that coverage for sales (employment) is lower: 74,511 (73,613) firms in the
full sample and 40,576 (40,389) among buyers.
Table I summarizes the resulting links in the network of firms, which is much more dense
than suggested by data exclusively relying on SEC filings (as reported, for instance, by Barrot
and Sauvagnat (2016)). Among the more than 180,000 firms in our dataset, 80,000 have at least
one supplier link recorded. On average, our buyers have 3.85 suppliers, but many firms have
substantially more. The average numbers of customers and competitors is just slightly lower,
allowing to construct a dense network. The average length of buyer-supplier relationships in
our data is 4.46 years; the unconditional probability of buyer-supplier links breaking in any
given year is 22%. Only 6.3% of links that break over the observation period are reformed at
a later point in time, and almost never more than once. For buyer-supplier links the share of
links that are reestablished later on is higher, at 12.9%.9
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of suppliers and customers among firms. The
distributions are very skewed, with most firms having few suppliers and customers, and some
having many. Whenever we use the number of links in our regressions below, we will hence
use the log of one plus the number of links instead of the raw count in order to avoid our
8Firms sometimes undergo organizational changes where a firm identifier ceases to exist and one or more
new ones may be created (e.g. in cases of mergers and splits). In such cases, FactSet records the successor
identifiers, and we say that a buyer-seller relationship breaks only if there is no buyer-seller relationship with
one of the successor firms.
9In appendix B.4 we show that our main results are robust to not counting relationships as breaking if they
are subsequently reestablished.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the number of suppliers and customers
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Note: The sample consists of firms that have at least one supplier.
results being driven by outliers. The fact that the number of relationships is heavily skewed is
well-known from the literatures on firm heterogeneity and superstar firms.10 Table II confirms
that the firms with most connections account for a disproportionately large fraction of sales.
Table II—: Total sales by percentile of the # suppliers distribution
Fraction of Sales, %
All 100.0
Top 25% 78.1
Top 10% 58.6
Top 5% 46.8
Top 1% 25.8
Note: The table shows the average fraction of sales (over years) accounted for by firms in the top percentiles
of the distribution of the number of suppliers (firms with at least one supplier only).
Finally, one word of caution about these data. While the coverage of relationships is better
than in other large panels that span many industries and countries, it is probably still incom-
plete: relationships with small firms, and relationships that account for a small fraction of sales
or costs are presumably less likely to be recorded. Our data show about 500 listed suppliers for
Walmart in 2016, and Walmart is — together with Apple, Samsung, and the large auto manu-
facturers — one of the firms with the highest number of recorded suppliers. In reality though,
Walmart probably has tens of thousands of suppliers, suggesting that many relationships are
missing. The relationships recorded in our data are probably the larger or more important
ones.11
The second dataset we use is the set of mergers and acquisitions in Bureau Van Dijk’s
Zephyr database. Zephyr records deals and rumors about deals for mergers and acquisitions in
10The literature is vast; see, in particular, the recent empirical work by Bernard et al. (2017). Most similar to
us, Carballo et al. (2018) document the skewness of the customer distribution and sales for international buyers
of Latin American firms. In theoretical work, Oberfield (2018) explains how superstar firms emerge in a setting
where firms search for suppliers.
11Alternatively, one could use administrative VAT transaction records, as are available for countries like
Belgium (Bernard et al., 2017) and Chile (Huneeus, 2018). However, in that case our study would be limited
to relatively small samples and few vertical merger cases (as well as additional constraints imposed by the
confidential nature of these data).
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which at least a 2% stake in the target company changes owners and the deal’s value exceeds
GBP 1M (Bollaert and Delanghe (2015)). For each merger or acquisition, Zephyr reports the
nature of the transaction, the identity of the target company, the acquiring company and the
seller, as well as the date of announcement, the date when the transaction was finished, and
the stake of the acquirer in the target before and after the acquisition. Zephyr also contains
a large number of rumored deals that never materialized, which we will use as a comparison
group in some of our regressions.
Analogously to the relationship data, we annualize the Zephyr data and construct a panel of
mergers and acquisitions between acquiring and acquired company. We focus on transactions
where one company fully acquires another or the entities merged. We infer the vertical or
horizontal nature of an integration by combining the M&A data with the input-output network:
a vertical integration is a merger or acquisition between two firms that have an ongoing buyer-
seller relationship in the year of integration.
The vast majority of mergers and acquisitions in our sample is between firms that do not
maintain a buyer-supplier relationship. Table III reports the number of mergers and acquisitions
between firms for which supply chain information is available. Only 6.7% of full acquisitions in
our sample result in vertical integration. The share is almost the same for partial acquisitions,
which we do not use in our analysis but report here for completeness. The non-vertical mergers
and acquisitions can be either purely horizontal or between unrelated firms that neither compete
directly nor supply each other with inputs. For the sake of brevity, we will refer to both mergers
and acquisitions as “mergers” for the remainder of the paper.
Table III—: Types of mergers and acquisitions
Non-vertical Vertical Total
Count % Count % Count %
Partial acquisitions 745 93.2 54 6.8 799 100.0
Full acquisitions & mergers 2,799 93.3 201 6.7 3,000 100.0
Total 3,544 93.3 255 6.7 3,799 100.0
Note: Number of partial and full mergers and acquisitions by presence vertical relation between the merging
parties (2003-2016). Partial acquisitions exclude minority stakes. For a breakdown including horizontal mergers
see Appendix A.
There is a small but non-negligible number of cases with risk of vertical foreclosure. Table
IV summarizes key statistics about the buyer-supplier relations in our sample. While the
unconditional probability that a relation ends in a given year is only 22.4%, this probability is
more than 50% in cases where the supplier integrates vertically with a competitor of the buyer.
In our data, this happens in 102 out of the 6613 cases in which a supplier vertically integrates
with another buyer.
Figure 2 shows the industry-wise and year-wise distribution of cases where the relationship
breaks following vertical integration of the supplier with a competitor of the buyer. These
situations are not confined to a narrow set of industries, but occur broadly across the economy.
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Table IV—: Buyer-supplier links: hazard rates of links breaking and risk of foreclosure
Value
P(link breaks) 0.224
Avg. relatation duration 4.46
Number of cases where supplier vertically integrates 6613
Number of cases where supplier integrates w. competitor 199
... and buyer-supplier link breaks 102
Note: The first row reports the unconditional probability that a buyer-supplier relationship ends in a given
year. The second row reports the average length of these relations. The third row counts the number of cases
in which a supplier vertically integrates. The fourth row restricts this number to cases where the vertical
integration involves a competitor of the buyer. The fifth row counts the instances in which the buyer-supplier
link breaks following vertical integration of the supplier with a competitor of the buyer.
A particularly large number of such cases falls into computer and electronics manufacturing, in
which there are many large firms that are frequently undertaking mergers and acquisitions.
In the short panel that is available to us, there is no clear trend over time in the number
of potential foreclosure cases. Whereas recent research has documented a rise market power
since the early eighties (De Loecker et al., 2018), this does not translate into an increase in the
number of potential foreclosure cases over time in our sample.
Figure 2: Potential foreclosure cases by sector and year
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Note: A potential foreclosure case is a situation where a buyer-seller relationship breaks following integration
of the supplier with a competitor of the buyer. About three quarters of potentially foreclosed firms are US
firms.
We complement the relationship and M&A data by sales and employment figures and in-
dustry codes from Compustat, Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database and FactSet Fundamentals
(2003–2014). Since these data have been widely used in the literature, we will not describe
them here.12 The last rows of Table I show summary statistics for sales and employment.
12See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) for detailed information on Orbis. We use a current and past vintage of
Orbis to have a better coverage.
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3 Extensive-margin Foreclosure
3.1 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is to study whether vertical relationships are more likely to break after
the supplier integrated with a competitor of a buyer, than when it integrated with an unrelated
firm. Consider a vertical relationship between seller s and buyer b. If b is a competitor of the
firm b′ that s is integrating with, then the integrating parties may have an incentive to foreclose
b. If, on the other hand, b and b′ are in different markets, then b would not be threatened by
foreclosure (see Figure 3). Our strategy is therefore to compare the probability of the (b, s)
relationship breaking between these two scenarios.
We define markets through the competitor relationships that we observe in FactSet Revere.
FactSet constructs these competitor relationships based on firm’s product portfolios and self-
disclosed competitor relationships from SEC filings. We prefer this definition over industry
code-based definitions for two reasons. Firstly, even 6-digit NAICS categories are often broad
and encompass many different product markets (e.g. NAICS 334310: “Audio and Video Equip-
ment Manufacturing”). Secondly, many of the firms in our sample are large firms that operate in
different product markets, which are not always reflected in the SIC or NAICS codes. For those
firms, competitor relationships are usually not transitive. As a result, the FactSet competitor
relationships are very different from co-memberships in industry cells: among competitor pairs
according to FactSet, only 43.5% are among firms that share a 4-digit NAICS code. Conversely,
among all pairs of firms that share a 4-digit NAICS code, only 0.03% coincide with a FactSet
competitor link.13
We estimate the following linear probability model14 on the set of all triples (b, s, t) where
s is listed as one of b’s suppliers (or b is listed as one of s’s customers) for at least one day in
year t:
✶{LinkBreaks}bst = α✶{s vertically integrates}st
+ β✶{s integrates vertically w. competitor of b}bst
+ ηbs + ηbt + ηi(b)i(s)t + εbst (1)
where ✶{LinkBreaks}bst is a dummy variable that is one if and only if the vertical relationship
between b and s is active during year t, but not during year t+1 (and also not between entities
that are successors to b or s in case of a split or change in organizational form). The right-hand
side variables are a dummy for whether s vertically integrates during year t, and a dummy
for whether s vertically integrates with a competitor of b during year t. We include (i) fixed
effects for buyer × year, ηbt, to control for time-varying characteristics of the buyer that could
13The corporate finance literature is well aware that industry co-membership is a poor way to measure
competitor relationships. Rauh and Sufi (2011) use competitor definitions from CapitalIQ and argue that this
method captures competitor relationships much more accurately than using industry codes. Hoberg and Phillips
(2010) develop measures of product market competition from text analysis of firm filings.
14We use a linear model as a benchmark specification because it allows us to include high-dimensional fixed
effects. We estimate hazard models in Appendix B.3, and find similar results.
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Figure 3: Empirical strategy: compare situations where buyers b and b′ are in same vs. different
markets
s
b b′
competitors
Integration
(a) Buyers b and b′ in same market: foreclosure
potential
s
b b′
Integration
(b) Buyers b, b′ in different markets: no
foreclosure potential
Note: This figure illustrates the main empirical strategy. We compare two situations in which a seller s
integrates with a buyer b′: one in which b and b′ compete in the same product markets (a) and one in which
they do not (b).
make all its supplier relationships more likely to break during a given year (such as exit), (ii)
buyer × supplier fixed effects, ηbs, thereby identifying the coefficients of interest, α and β, from
within-relationship variation in the hazard rate of the relationships breaking, and in the firms’
characteristics, and (iii) industry-pair × year fixed effects, ηi(b)i(s)t, which takes out industry-
specific (or industry-pair-specific) shocks that may lead to a higher break probability (where
industries are defined at the 3-digit NAICS level). We exclude relations from the regression
where the buyer and supplier themselves are the vertically integrating parties.
Table V—: Correlation of buyer-supplier link breaking with vertical integration of supplier
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier v. integrates 0.021 0.013 0.005 0.020
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.181∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.059) (0.062) (0.051)
Controls Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.578 0.578 0.619 0.671
Observations 640725 640708 472763 472763
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other links
of the supplier breaking. Robust standard errors clustered at the supplier-year level. The number of reported
observations is the number of non-singleton observations. The drop in the number of observations in columns
(3) and (4) is explained by firms with missing industry codes. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table V shows the result from estimating equation 1 using ordinary least squares. The first
column shows that when suppliers are vertically integrating, the probability of a given vertical
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relationship breaking is higher by about 2.1 percentage points (though this is not statistically
significant). Given that the unconditional probability of a relationship breaking in our data is
about 22%, this would constitute an increase of about 9%. Column (2) shows that the likelihood
of the vertical relationship breaking is indeed much higher (18 percentage points difference, or a
80% higher probability) when the buyer is a competitor to the downstream merging firm. This
difference remains large and statistically significant when including industry pair × year fixed
effects to control for sector- or sector-pair-specific shocks (column 3), and when controlling for
a range of supplier and relationship characteristics (column 4).
It is worth pointing out that the results above are unlikely to be driven by the possibility
that a relationship may not be observed by FactSet following a merger, because the firm entity
has ceased to exist, or because it may not be tracked anymore: if that was the case, we should
be seeing a substantially increased hazard also following vertical mergers with firms that are
not competitors of the downstream merging firm.
Figure 4 shows graphically how break probabilities differ across these two types of vertical
integration events. The horizontal axis shows the time after a vertical integration event of the
supplier; the vertical axis shows the probability of the relationship having broken (i.e. one
minus the probability of the relationship being active). By definition of the sample, in the
year of integration of the supplier the buyer-seller relationship must be active. We see that
relationships where the supplier integrates with a competitor of the buyer (solid blue line) are
much less likely to survive the post-integration years, in particular the year following integration,
than relationships where the supplier integrates with a non-competitor of the buyer (dashed
red line). The dotted green line shows relationship survival rates for simulated placebo events
that are generated to occur with 0.6% probability in any given year where a relationship is
active. This corresponds to the average probability that a supplier in a given relation vertically
integrates. The regression that generates these marginal effects include relationship, buyer-
year, and industry-pair year fixed effects; the corresponding plot of a regression without fixed
effects looks very similar.
Next, we study variation across industries in the relationship between vertical integration
and links breaking. Most theories of vertical foreclosure, in particular the raising rivals’ cost
theories and extending monopoly power theories of vertical foreclosure predict that market
power in the bottleneck market increases the incentives to foreclose. We want to empirically
assess this prediction. In order to do so, we study whether the correlation between integration
with a competitor and relationships breaking is lower when the supplier has less market power.
We measure the supplier’s market power by the number of his competitors.15 More specifically,
we run the regression
15Alternatively, one could measure the supplier’s market power with market shares. Our sales coverage among
suppliers and in upstream markets generally, however, is very limited, so we prefer measuring supplier market
power through the number of competitors.
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Figure 4: Probability of relationships having broken after supplier’s vertical integration
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Note: The figure shows coefficients on dummies capturing the years since a supplier’s vertical integration, in a
regression of the probability of a buyer-seller relationship being inactive on time-since-integration dummies, as
well as relationship, buyer × year, and industry-pair × year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
supplier-year level. The solid blue line denotes relationships where the supplier integrates with a competitor of
the buyer; the dashed red line denotes relationships where the supplier integrates with a non-competitor of the
buyer; the dotted green line represents relationships where a placebo integration event has been drawn to occur.
That placebo event is randomly drawn to occur with 0.6% probability in any given year where a relationship is
active (and independently across relationship-years).
✶{LinkBreaks}bst = α✶{s vertically integrates}st
+ β✶{s integrates vertically w. competitor of b}bst
+ γ✶{s integrates vertically w. competitor of b}bst × Cst
+ δCst
+ ηbs + µbt + εbst (2)
where Cst is a variable capturing the number of competitors of the supplier s at time t. Just
like the number of buyers and suppliers is heavily skewed, so is the number of competitors,
therefore we use the log of one plus the number of competitors for Cst.
Table VI shows the results. We find that the correlation between buyer-supplier-links break-
ing and vertical integration of a supplier with a competitor is lower when the supplier has more
competitors (columns (1) and (2)). This result is in line with theories of foreclosure: the
existence of more alternative suppliers to the buyer reduces the incentives of the acquirer to
foreclose competitors. In columns (3) and (4) we also include interactions with the number
of competitors of the buyer. Perhaps surprisingly, the point estimates of the coefficients on
these interaction terms are slightly positive (though not statistically significant). While not
12
being entirely conclusive, it does not seem to be the case that more competition in the down-
stream market reduces the probability of links breaking after integration with a competitor.
This stands in contrast to theories where foreclosure arises to preserve market power on the
downstream market.
Table VI—: Interaction with the number of upstream competitors
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.562∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 0.325 0.246
(0.171) (0.160) (0.342) (0.312)
Supp. v. int. w. comp. × # upstream comp. -0.127∗ -0.111∗ -0.126 -0.110
(0.057) (0.054) (0.093) (0.086)
Supplier v. integrates 0.008 0.025∗∗ 0.008 0.025
(0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.022)
# upstream competitors -0.016∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Supp. v. int. w. competitor × # downstream competitors 0.064 0.058
(0.047) (0.040)
Controls Yes Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.619 0.667 0.619 0.667
Observations 472763 472763 472763 472763
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers, age of the link, dummy indicating other links of the supplier
breaking. “Upstream competitors” is the number of competitors of the supplier; “downstream competitors” is
the number of competitors of the buyer. Table reports robust standard errors, clustered at the supplier-year
level. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Tables V and VI show a correlation that by itself is not evidence for vertical foreclosure. We
see that relationships are relatively much more likely to break when the supplier is undergoing
a vertical merger with a competitor of the buyer, than when it is merging with a firm that is not
competitor of the buyer. The fact that this correlation is stronger when the supplier has few
competitors lends support to the view that vertical foreclosure along the extensive margin could
be occurring in the population of firms that we study. Yet, the regressions are not necessarily
evidence for a causal link between mergers and the breaking of relationships, simply because
mergers do not happen randomly. In particular, there are three main confounding explanations:
Firstly, it could be that the integration between the supplier and the competitor is a con-
sequence of the relationship between buyer and supplier breaking; for instance because the
supplier’s acquirer might be concerned that the supplier would otherwise exit.16 In that case
our regression would suffer from reverse causality: integration with a competitor of the buyer
16Bolton and Whinston (1993) study firms’ incentives to vertically integrate for supply assurance reasons.
In this situation, “exit” does not have to be a complete exit of the supplier, but could be just an exit from a
particular market.
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would be relatively more likely because the competitor could be purchasing exactly those goods
that the supplier is discontinuing.
Secondly, it could be that both the breaking of the relationship and the vertical integration
are the result of an unobserved shock hitting one of the firms. Such a shock would need to make
the supplier more likely to integrate with competitors of its buyers than with a non-competitor
in order to explain the different magnitude of the coefficient estimates in Table V. We discuss
these alternative explanations in turn.
Thirdly, if synergies between the vertically integrating firms are very strong, the resulting
cost savings in the production of the downstream good could drive their competitors in the
downstream market out of the product market, and lead them to stop buying from the upstream
integrating firm.
We proceed to discuss the first two alternative explanations, and turn to the third one after
showing the impact of separations on sales in Section 4.
3.2 Reverse causality: vertical integration for supply assurance?
Our relationship between links breaking and vertical integration may be driven by suppliers’
motivation to exit certain product markets and cut ties with some of their customers, which
in turn may cause them to be acquired by one of their customers. We therefore apply an
instrumental variable strategy that exploits shocks that are outside of the control of the firm
and that make integration more likely. Our instrument builds on Edmans et al. (2012), who
show that when large mututal funds experience an outflow of capital, they are forced to sell off
assets, which puts downward pressure on the share prices of firms in their portfolio. In turn,
these firms become more likely to be acquired.
We follow Edmans et al. (2012) and Dessaint et al. (2016) and construct a variable capturing
the hypothetical (not actual) share sales of large U.S. mutual funds in response to an outflow of
investor capital. We first calculate the net inflow of capital to the fund based on its total net
asset holdings and returns reported in the CRSP mututal funds database. For funds j that see
a net outflow of more than five percent of its total net assets in a given quarter q, we calculate
the hypothetical sales of a stock i if holdings of all assets were reduced proportionally to the
outflow.17 The total hypothetical sales of a stock i from mutual fund outflows are then
MFHSi,q =
∑
j: Flowj,q<−0.05
(Flowj,q · Sharesji,q−1 · Pricei,q−1)
We sum this variable over the four quarters in the year and normalize the sum by the total
trading volume in that year.
The normalized MFHS variable is meant to capture the downward pressure on prices that is
exerted by the fund’s capital outflow. Figure 5a shows the average response of cumulative stock
returns following a large mututal fund outflow event (defined as normalized MFHS below the
17Data on mututal fund stock holdings come from the Thomson Spectrum CDA database, and stock prices
from Thomson Worldscope. See Appendix A for data sources and definitions.
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tenth percentile). Stock prices drop significantly as the shock hits and then recover to the pre-
shock level. Figure 5b shows the response of the probability to be involved in the completion
of a vertical merger or acquisition before and after such an event. In the year after the outflow
event, the probability of integration is significantly higher. The one year lag between outflow
event and completion of the acquisition may reflect the time to negotiate the acquisition and
the antitrust authority’s clearance.
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Figure 5: Response to a mutual fund outflow event
Note: The figures show the average response of cumulative stock returns (vertical axis, left panel), and the
average response of the probability to engage in a vertical merger or acquisition (vertical axis, right panel)
following a mutual fund capital outflow (defined as normalized MFHS being below the tenth percentile) at
quarter 0. Both regressions contain firm and industry-time fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.
Table VII shows the results of estimating equation (1) with the interaction terms instru-
mented by an interaction of the competitor status with a dummy that is one if the vertical
integration happens up to two years after a mutual fund outflow event (which, as the construc-
tion suggests, happens disproportionately often: in about a third of our cases of integration
with a competitor). This instrument effectively limits the set of vertical mergers that are being
considered to post-outflow vertical mergers, which are much less likely to be driven by the per-
formance of suppliers or buyers. The estimated coefficient on the variable representing vertical
integration with a competitor of the buyer remains large and statistically significant, suggesting
that our baseline results are not driven by the possibility that integration is the response to
links breaking. While the point estimates are slightly larger than in our baseline, they are also
less precise. It is therefore not clear whether OLS was biased in the first place. Indeed, an
overidentification C-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the regressors are exogenous
(p = 0.11).
As an alternative to the IV strategy, we show results where we restrict attention to a
subsample of firms that are “healthy”, and are therefore less likely than the average firm to cut
substantial parts of their product mix.
Table VIII shows results of estimating equation (1) on the sample of firms that have positive
sales growth between years t−2 and t−1 (columns (1) to (3)), or sales growth above the median
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Table VII—: Relationships breaking following Vertical Integration: IV results
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3)
Supplier v. integrates -0.002 -0.008 0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.262∗∗∗ 0.202∗
(0.074) (0.081)
Controls Yes
Method IV IV IV
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes
R2 0.578 0.578 0.671
Observations 640725 640708 472763
Note: This table shows regressions where the interactions are instrumented by an interaction of the competitor
dummy with a dummy that is one if the vertical merger happens up to and including two periods after a
mututal funds outflow event. This effectively reduces the explanatory variable to include only post-outflow
vertical mergers (instead of all vertical mergers). Because of this interaction, the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap
F -statistic is large. Robust standard errors, clustered at the supplier-year level, are in parentheses. + p < 0.10,
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
of three percent (columns (4) to (6)). The point estimates of the coefficient on the integration
with a competitor variable are larger than in our baseline specifications (even though the smaller
sample makes the estimate less precise). Firms that are growing are much less likely to exit
product markets (Goldberg et al., 2010). For the firms in this subsample, the causality is hence
much less likely to run from the breaking of the relationship to vertical integration.
3.3 Unobserved shocks: omitted variables
3.3.1 Comparison with rumors of mergers and acquisitions
Our next exercise speaks to the possibility that both vertical integration and the discontinuation
of buyer-supplier relationships are the response to unobserved shocks. As discussed above, such
shocks must be directed to make integration with a competitor of the buyer more likely in
order to explain the correlation in the baseline tables. One could think of one buyer making an
innovation which increases the need for customization of the supplied input, while also driving
the competitor out of business. The innovator and supplier choose to vertically integrate to
reduce the inefficiency associated with the hold-up problem (Klein et al., 1978).
We try to find a group of firms that is most comparable in terms of the shocks that they
may have been facing, but for an exogenous reason do not manage to vertically integrate. The
closest we can get to such a comparison group is by considering rumors of mergers and mergers
that have been announced, but for some reason have not been completed. Zephyr collects the
former from “unconfirmed reports”, which “may be in the press, in a company press release,
or elsewhere” (Bureau Van Dijk, 2017). Our approach is hence similar to the comparison of
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Table VIII—: Regressions on relationships with “healthy” suppliers
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
Sample: ∆ log Saless
t−1 > 0 Sample: ∆ log Sales
s
t−1 > median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier v. integrates 0.033 0.021 0.033 0.048 0.022 0.036
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.387∗∗ 0.313∗ 0.213+ 0.373∗∗ 0.361∗ 0.238
(0.118) (0.129) (0.122) (0.144) (0.155) (0.146)
Controls Yes Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.606 0.674 0.709 0.616 0.685 0.719
Observations 251966 191654 191654 197738 148121 148121
Note: Columns (1) to (3) restrict the sample to buyer-supplier pairs where ∆ log Saless
t−1 is above zero,
columns (4) to (6) where it is above the median. Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age
of the link, dummy indicating other links of the supplier breaking. Number of observations exclude singleton
observations. Robust standard errors, clustered at the supplier-year level, in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01.
a placebo with the actual treatment in the sense that our rumor or attempted merger does
not actually result in vertical integration (but potentially with the difference that even an
attempted merger may lead to buyers switching suppliers). Rumors are dated at the time when
they are first mentioned. While buyers in rumored and actual treatments are quite comparable,
the suppliers that are rumored to integrate are somewhat larger than the suppliers that actually
integrate (see Table XVIII in the appendix). Note that we can control for these differences in
our regressions and also do not find differential effects for larger or smaller suppliers.
We first study the benchmark specification, equation (1), with actual vertical integration
events replaced by the rumors and announced but not completed mergers.18 This specification
compares the average probability of links breaking outside of such events with the average
break probability under a rumored vertical integration, and one with a competitor of the buyer.
Table IX reports the results of these regressions. Links break slightly less often during rumored
vertical integration with non-competitors of the buyer, and slightly more often (though not
statistically significantly so) during rumored vertical integration with competitors. The point
estimate of the coefficient on the “rumored vertical integration with competitor” dummy is
certainly much lower that the corresponding point estimate in the benchmark regression with
actual mergers (though note that the comparison is not straightforward: the dummy here is
one at the rumor or announcement date, whereas it is one in Table V on the completion date).
Table XXI in Appendix B.2 shows results with both rumors and actual integration events in
the same regression.
To investigate more closely the timing aspect and to have the tightest possible compari-
18We do not count a merger as a rumor if it has been later announced and completed.
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Table IX—: Links are not more likely to break following rumors of M&A
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2)
Supplier v. integrates (rumor) -0.030+ -0.029+
(0.018) (0.016)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor (rumor) 0.031 0.020
(0.039) (0.035)
Controls Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.586 0.639
Observations 596656 596657
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other links
of the supplier breaking. Number of observations exclude singleton observations. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
son between actual and rumored/attempted mergers, we compare the break probability before
and after actual mergers with buyers’ competitors to the break probability before and after
rumored/attempted mergers with buyers’ competitors. In both cases we use the date of the
announcement. More precisely, we run a regression of a binary variable that is one if the rela-
tionship is not active anymore on a set of dummies for the number of years since announcement,
separately for actual and rumored mergers (and separately by whether the merger is with a
competitor of the buyer), and including relationship, buyer × year, and sector-pair × year fixed
effects.
Figure 6 shows the results. Following the announcement, break probabilities are substan-
tially higher for actual than for rumored vertical mergers with competitors. Not only are
relationships where there is a rumor about the supplier integrating with a competitor not more
likely to break in the first period, but these relationships seem to be fairly long-lasting. To
the extent that rumors and situations in which announced mergers are unsuccessful are a good
comparison group to actual merger events, vertical integration and links breaking are unlikely
to be driven by the same underlying unobserved shocks.
3.4 Is foreclosure a merger motive?
The correlations presented above are consistent with theories of vertical market foreclosure.
That said, even if the timing of a vertical integration of the supplier is exogenous, the party
with whom the supplier integrates may not be unrelated to firm or market structure: an acquirer
that senses a foreclosure opportunity may be willing to pay a premium, and is therefore more
likely than alternative bidders to be the winning bidder.
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Figure 6: Probability of relationships breaking: actual vs rumored integration with competitor
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Note: The figure shows coefficients on dummies capturing the years since a supplier’s rumored (dashed red
line) or actual (solid blue line) vertical integration, in a regression of the probability of a buyer-seller relationship
being inactive on time-since-integration dummies (separately for rumored mergers with competitors, with non-
competitors, and actual mergers with competitors, and with non-competitors) as well as relationship, buyer ×
year, and industry-pair × year fixed effects. Here, time zero is the time of the rumor or the announcement of
the merger. We exclude rumors that are realized within three years.
To study whether vertical foreclosure is a merger motive, we run the regression
✶{b integrates with s}bst = α✶{b has a competitor that is supplied by s}st
+ ηst + εbst (3)
on the sample of active buyer-supplier relationships (b, s) at time t when the supplier s is
undergoing a vertical integration with one of its customers. The coefficient α tells us whether
buyers that have a competitor that is also a customer of the supplier are more likely to be the
one that is integrating with the supplier — conditional on the supplier vertically integrating.
These buyers potentially have a motive to foreclose their competitors.
Table X shows the results. The point estimate of α is positive and statistically significant.
Given that the unconditional probability of being the integrating party in this sample is about
three percent, having a foreclosure motive is associated with a roughly 55% higher probability
of being the firm that integrates with the supplier. In column (2) we control for the buyer’s
(log of one plus the) number of suppliers and competitors, which proxies for size and alleviates
the concern that buyers with a competitor among the seller’s customers are just those that are
larger. In column (3) we include dummies for the buyer’s industry times year, to control for
industry-time-specific shocks. Neither of these controls affect the estimate of α much. Hence,
firms that have a foreclosure motive (in the sense that s is also supplying their competitor) are
more likely to be the integrating party at a time when s vertically integrates.
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Table X—: Buyers with competitors that are also supplied by S are more likely to integrate with S
Dependent variable: ✶{B and S integrate}bst
(1) (2) (3)
B has competitor supplied by S 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes
Supplier × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer Industry × Year FE Yes
R2 0.101 0.105 0.167
Observations 6812 6812 5960
Note: Sample consists of all active buyer-seller relationships at a time where the supplier vertically integrates
with a buyer. Controls: number of buyer’s competitors and suppliers. Reported number of observations is net
of singleton observations. The drop in the number of observations in column (3) is explained by firms with
missing industry codes. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
3.5 International relationships and cross-border mergers
We now turn to studying the international dimension in our regressions. Buyers with foreign
suppliers may be at higher risk of foreclosure if competition authorities do not take foreign
markets into account in their merger evaluation. Similarly, cross-border mergers, which account
for about 20% of full vertical mergers (Table XI), may receive a different degree of scrutiny than
purely domestic mergers. We therefore look at whether the extensive margin of (cross-border
or domestic) relationships correlates differently with integration.
Table XI—: Domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions
Non-vertical Vertical Total
Count % Count % Count %
Domestic 2,038 92.7 161 7.3 2,199 100.0
Cross-border 761 95.0 40 5.0 801 100.0
Total 2,799 93.3 201 6.7 3,000 100.0
Note: Number of full mergers and acquisitions by presence of a vertical relation between the merging parties
(2003-2016). M&As are counted as domestic if both merging parties are headquartered in the same country,
otherwise they are considered cross-border M&A.
Table XII shows the results. The first two columns are the same as in Table V with the
difference that we add country-pair × year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) include interac-
tions with a dummy that is one if b and s are registered in different countries. Whereas the
coefficient on the interaction with any kind of vertical integration by a supplier is negative and
weakly statistically significant, we do not find evidence suggesting that international relations
are more likely to become targets of foreclosure. Columns (5) and (6) include interactions with
a dummy that is one if the buyer that s is integrating with is located in a different country.
Their coefficients, too, are small and insignificant. International mergers seem to be no different
to domestic mergers when it comes to their likelihood of foreclosing the competition.
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Table XII—: International Relationships, International M&A’s
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier v. integrates 0.003 0.018 0.014 0.028 -0.001 0.015
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.187∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.063) (0.052) (0.065) (0.054) (0.065) (0.054)
S integrates × Intl. Rel. -0.046∗ -0.042+
(0.023) (0.023)
S integrates w. comp. × Intl. Rel. 0.106 0.045
(0.112) (0.106)
S integrates × Intl. M&A. 0.078 0.057
(0.088) (0.082)
S integrates w. comp. × Intl. M&A. 0.004 0.001
(0.231) (0.196)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.636 0.683 0.636 0.683 0.636 0.674
Observations 464643 464643 464643 464643 464643 472412
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other links
of the supplier breaking. Robust standard errors clustered at the supplier-year level. The number of reported
observations is the number of non-singleton observations. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
4 Impact on Foreclosed Firms
4.1 Impact on Sales
The results from the previous section show that buyer-seller relationships are more likely to
break when the downstream merging firm is a competitor of the buyer. The obvious next
question is: does it matter? If the input market is frictionless and perfectly competitive, the
cost to losing a supplier is zero (of course, in such a situation there is no foreclosure motive at
all). If, on the other hand, the use of outside suppliers is associated with a higher variable cost,
then the loss of the supplier will push the buyer along the demand curve to a point where the
firm operates at a lower scale.
We now study the response of firm sales to events where (1) a supplier of the firm verti-
cally integrates; (2) a supplier of the firm vertically integrates with a competitor of the firm.
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Specifically, we estimate the equation
log Salesbt = α✶{A supplier vertically integrates}bt
+ β✶{A supplier integrates vertically w. competitor of b}bt
+ ηb + µi(b)t + εbt (4)
where ηb is a buyer fixed effect, and µi(b)t is an industry × year fixed effect. While our sales
variable is constructed from accounting data and is probably measured with error, this should
not bias our estimates as long as the measurement error is classical.
The first two columns of Table XIII show the results. In a year where a supplier of the
firm is integrating with a non-competitor, the firm’s sales are slightly higher; if the integration
happens with a competitor, the sales are slightly lower than average. But this small coefficient is
masking a lot of heterogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) interact the dummy for vertical integration
with a competitor with a variable capturing the number of other suppliers from the same 3-
digit sector as the supplier that the firm is being cut off from (at the time of the integration).
This means that the coefficient on the “integration with competitor” variable now captures the
average sales response for a firm that does not already have any “alternative” suppliers already
in place in the sector where its supplier vertically integrates.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table XIII show that the point estimates of this coefficient are large
and negative: firms that are cut off from a supplier that they do not already have an existing
alternative to are suffering a large drop in sales. On the other hand, the presence of alternative
suppliers mitigates the sales impact. Note that the sales loss may capture both a movement
along the demand curve due to higher variable costs, as well as a potential loss of market share
due to the competitor experiencing cost reductions after the vertical integration. At the same
time, we see the sales drop only when a supplier vertically integrates with a competitor – so
unless the cost reductions are particularly taking place in vertical integration episodes with the
buyer’s competitors, it is unlikely that this channel plays a major role in driving the buyer’s
sales response. Columns (5) and (6) show IV estimates where the vertical integration dummy
is instrumented by a dummy that is one iff the vertical merger happens up to and including two
periods after a mutual fund outflow event. Estimates are very similar to the OLS estimates. In
all specifications the model fit is very good – but that is due to the fixed effects absorbing most
of the variation in sales. In Appendix B.1 we show results with employment on the left-hand
side. We do not find a drop in firm employment when a supplier integrates with a competitor.
Figure 7 shows an event study graph around the time of vertical integration of a supplier
with a non-competitor (dashed red line) and with a competitor, for firms that have no existing
alternative suppliers (solid blue line). We see that in cases where the supplier is vertically
integrating with a competitor, firms’ sales are substantially lower if they do not have existing
alternative suppliers.
Finally, we look at the sales impact of foreclosure in international mergers. Table XIV
shows results when we restrict attention to cross-border mergers. The point estimates of the
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Table XIII—: Impact on buyer’s sales
Dependent variable: Log sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier v.integrates 0.042∗∗ 0.018+ 0.042∗∗ 0.018+ 0.020+ 0.020+
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor -0.038 -0.052+ -0.137∗ -0.143∗ -0.036 -0.114∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.060) (0.058) (0.029) (0.046)
× log(1 + # alt. suppliers) 0.043∗ 0.040∗ 0.035∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 77202 77202 77202 77202 77202 77202
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Note: Controls: number of customers, competitors and suppliers. In columns (5) and (6), the interaction terms
are instrumented by an interaction of the competitor status with a dummy that is one if the vertical integration
happens up to two years after a mutual fund outflow event. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level,
are in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure 7: Timing of the correlation of buyers’ log sales with vertical integration of a supplier
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Note: The figure presents the results of estimating equation 4 with two leads and lags for both
✶{A supplier integrates vertically w. competitor of b}bt and ✶{A supplier integrates vertically}bt. Confidence
intervals are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
“integration with competitor” dummy are very similar to those in Table XIII.
4.2 Can synergies account for breaking supplier links?
One potential alternative explanation of our finding that vertical relations are more likely to
end when the supplier vertically integrates with the buyer’s competitor is that there are very
strong synergies from the merger. If synergies give the integrated downstream firm a large cost
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Table XIV—: Sales impact: International Mergers
Dependent variable: Log sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier v. integrates (intl. M&A) 0.040∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Supplier v. integrates w. comp. (intl. M&A) -0.034 -0.050 -0.097+ -0.108+
(0.032) (0.031) (0.057) (0.057)
× log(1 + # alt. suppliers) 0.027+ 0.025
(0.016) (0.016)
Buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 77,202 77,202 77,202 77,202
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other
links of the supplier breaking. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of reported
observations is the number of non-singleton observations. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
advantage, the unintegrated downstream competitor may be forced to exit the product market,
which may lead it to cut its ties to the upstream firm.
If this explanation was driving our results, however, we would expect that vertical integra-
tion would adversely affect the market shares of all downstream firms in the industry, including
competitors that did not have a supplier relationship with the integrating upstream unit. Table
XV shows results from a regression of log firm sales on a dummy that is one if the firm has a
competitor in that year that vertically integrates (and firm and industry × year fixed effects, as
well as the set of controls from above). We find no statistically significant correlation between
a competitor vertically integrating and a change in firm sales. This stands in contrast to the
situation that we looked at above, where a competitor is vertically integrating with the buyer’s
supplier, and where we observed a drop in firm sales.
These results are in line with the findings of Blonigen and Pierce (2016), who study the
effect of mergers and acquisitions on physical productivity and markups of U.S. manufacturing
establishment. They use a similar dataset of public and private mergers and acquisitions,
and find no effect of physical productivity of integrating plants, but a significant increase in
markups. While their data allows for a much more direct investigation of the productivity
effects of mergers and acquisition than our indirect results on competitor’s sales, the results
support the view that much of the impact of M&A is to reduce competition, and little to
increase economic efficiency.
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Table XV—: Impact of vertical integration on competitors’ sales
Dependent variable: Log sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A competitor v.integrates 0.013 -0.021
(0.040) (0.039)
max(t, t− 1) 0.023
(0.035)
max(t, t− 1, t− 2) 0.056
(0.036)
Buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 120,689 120,689 120,689 120,689
R2 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
Note: The variable in the second (third) row is a dummy that is one if a competitor has undergone a vertical
integration in the current or last year (current or last two years). Controls: number of customers, competitors
and suppliers. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are in parentheses. The number of observations
is larger here than in Table XIII because we have more firms with sales data that have competitor relationships
than firms with supplier relationships. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.3 Discussion
Enforcement and welfare
Our results suggest that existing antitrust measures have not managed to fully prevent vertical
foreclosure in the sample that we study. Since we find similar results on domestic and interna-
tional mergers, it does not seem to be the case that international mergers are exposed to more
scrutiny from competition authorities. Overall, we get the impression that vertical merger en-
forcement is lax throughout, possibly because of the intellectual history of the question (Salop,
2017).
At the same time, it is likely that there are many other cases of foreclosure than the ones
we highlight. Our events are those where a buyer is fully foreclosed, i.e. the relationship fully
breaks. A situation that is perhaps more prevalent is where the buyer is facing higher prices
offered by the bottleneck supplier. Evaluating such situations would require data on prices.
Even if the vertical foreclosure is taking place in some of the cases we studied, the overall
welfare consequences are not necessarily negative, in particular because consumer prices might
fall due to increases in productivity or changes in competition. Frictions in firm-to-firm markets
are likely to impose additional transaction costs, which will be reflected in the prices paid by
final consumers. A full structural analysis of the welfare cost of vertical foreclosure across a
broad range of industries is beyond the scope of this paper, but we view our reduced-form
evidence as a first step in this direction.
25
Mechanism of foreclosure
Having read newspaper coverage and SEC filings related to some of the potentially foreclosing
mergers and acquisitions, we find it plausible that in many of these cases the integrating firms
are not directly cutting off the competing downstream firm. The documents filed by the inte-
grating firms typically emphasize that existing contracts with customers of the upstream firm
will be honored. In some cases, however, firms also state that clauses in these contracts allow
the customers to withdraw from the agreement. Upon integration, customers of the integrating
supplier may find themselves wanting to break the relationships because continuing the rela-
tionship would be associated with a strategic disadvantage on the output market.19 But even
if these customers initiated the break, foreclosure is taking place when they have been hurt by
the integration.
As an example, consider the acquisition of hard drive disk platter producer Komag by its
customer Western Digital (WD) in 2007. Komag had also been supplying WD’s rivals Seagate,
Maxtor, and Hitachi, and these relationships ceased after integration. In a conference call with
market analysts, a senior executive fromWD said about Komag’s future relationships with their
existing customers: “[...] we are prepared to provide all customers with the committed volumes
outlined in their existing volume purchase arrangement. However, customers will determine
their [input] requirement. Therefore, there could be a significant reduction in volume from
those customers [...].” (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007).
5 Conclusion
This paper presents results that suggest that vertical foreclosure along the extensive margin is
occurring among large firms, across a range of sectors in the economy, and both for domestic
and international mergers. Vertical relationships are much more likely to break when the
supplier is integrating with a competitor of the buyer, than when the supplier is integrating
with an unrelated party. Depending on market structure, the firm that integrated with the
supplier may have an incentive to prevent its competitor from continuing to purchase from the
supplier. We find that this higher hazard rate for links breaking remains statistically significant
when only considering integration events that occur after exogenous downward pressure on the
suppliers’ stock price. Rumored integration that never takes place is not associated with higher
hazard rate. We find that on average firms whose supplier vertically integrated with one of
their competitors experience a temporary drop in sales. This sales drop is lower for firms that
have relationships with other suppliers from the same industry in place.
19Such as strategic disadvantage may arise through the revelation of information to the competitor. See, e.g.
Hughes and Kao (2001) and Chen (2001).
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Appendix
A Data Sources and Definitions
We combine three components to construct the database used in this paper:
• A production and competitor network between large firms from FactSet Revere
• A comprehensive M&A database, Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr, with information on deals
and rumors about deals
• Company financials and industry classifications from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis, Compustat
and FactSet Fundamentals
This appendix describes each of the data sources as well as the key variables we derive from
them.
A.1 FactSet Revere supply chain data
Content and data sources
FactSet is a commercial data provider that mainly sells to companies in the financial services
sector. Its supply chain data (called “Revere”) provides information on the nature and duration
of vertical and horizontal relationships between firms. FactSet collects this information on
relations from primary public sources such as SEC filings, investor presentations, corporate
actions, company websites and press releases. For each firm, FactSet conducts an annual
review to update the database. In addition, press releases and corporate actions are monitored
daily for US firms.
Each relation between two companies is dated with a start date at which the relation was
first recorded by FactSet and with an end date at which it was noticed that the relation no longer
existed. In addition, each relation is categorized into buyer links, supplier links, competitor
links or partnerships. These broad categories are detailed into 13 subcategories (see Table
XVI). We use these categories to define two types of networks:
• Buyer-supplier network: a directed graph on which an edge is created when the target
company is a supplier of the source company, i.e. at least one of the following is true:
– the source company discloses the target company as a supplier of products or services
– the target company discloses the source company as a customer of products or ser-
vices
– the target company provides paid manufacturing, distribution or marketing services
to the source company
– the target company licenses products, patents, technology or IP to the source com-
pany
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Table XVI—: Number of relationships in raw FactSet Revere data
Frequency Percentage
Supplier 114,136 12.71
Competitor 197,423 21.98
Customer 290,893 32.38
Partner: Distribution 24,725 2.75
Partner: Equity investment 53,602 5.97
Partner: Production 12,737 1.42
Partner: Investor 48,244 5.37
Partner: Joint-Venture 29,845 3.32
Partner: Licensing 37,083 4.13
Partner: Marketing 16,296 1.81
Partner: Other 876 0.10
Partner: Research Collaboration 46,273 5.15
Partner: Technology 26,189 2.92
Total 898,322
Note: Frequency table of the raw number of relations in the relationship dataset from which we construct the
firm network. In line with the description in the documentation of the data, we count companies providing paid
distribution, production, marketing and licenses as suppliers.
• Competitor network: an undirected graph on which an edge is created if at least one of
the two company discloses the other one as a competitor
We do not include the partnership links provided by fact set for our analyses (Joint ventures,
Equity stakes, research collaborations and integrated product offerings).
Finally, many relations are also provided with a few keywords explaining the links, though
not in a fully systematic fashion. Companies can have multiple links, for instance in order to
document that a supplier is also in competition with a given customer.
Coverage
The data contain observations on 180,192 firms, some of which are “covered” companies (in the
sense that the data provider actively searches for information on these firms); the others show up
as suppliers, buyers, or competitors of covered companies. FactSet determines coverage mainly
based on membership of firms in major stock indexes. The provider aims to cover all companies
listed in a set of global indexes, such as the FTSE Global All Cap, Russel Global, Stoxx Global
and a range of global MSCI indexes. In addition, all US-based publicly traded firms are covered,
as well as companies that are part of multiple local and regional stock market indexes, i.e. large
non-US multinationals. FactSet achieves high but not complete coverge of the indexes. For
example, 90.3% of the firms in MSCI ACWI All Cap have relationship information, 95.4% of
the S&P 500 and 94.5% of the Russell 3000. While these coverage rules favor large listed firms,
there are many smaller and non-listed firms in our sample because they have relationships with
large firms.
Coverage varies by country. Figure 8 reports the number of firms in the database by the
country of their headquarters. Consistent with the fact that FactSet originally only covered US
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Figure 8: Number of firms by country
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Note: The figure reports the number of firms in the FactSet database by country of headquarter.
firms, about a quarter of the firms is based in the US. Due to efforts to expand the database in-
ternationally starting in 2007, and because of foreign firms trading with US firms, international
coverage goes well beyond large multinationals.
Figure 9: Number of firms by industry
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Note: The figure reports the number of firms in the FactSet database by primary industry classification.
While the database is not representative even of the universe of US firms, it does contain
a wide range of industries. Figure 9 reports the number of firms in the sample by a high-level
aggregation of NAICS industry codes. The manufacturing sector contains the largest share
of firms in our data, followed by financial services and insurances, and then by professional
services.
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When a company entity in the data ceases to exist, FactSet documents the reasons for it,
along with a successor company where it exists. This fact allows us, in particular, to identify
the successor company in the case of a complete merger or acquisition so that links are not
mechanically breaking at acquisition.
Figure 10: Number of firms over time
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Note: The figure presents the number of firms in the FactSet database by year.
The data start in 2003 and have been gradually expanded over time (Figure 10). Non-US
firms were included from 2007 onwards.
Key variables
We annualize the relationship data in order to facilitate the matching with the company finan-
cials. A relation of any kind is counted as active in a given year if there is at least one day
between start date and end date of the relation that falls into that year. The result is a panel
of relations that is identified by source company, target company and year.
Buyer-supplier link breaks: The variable is one if and only if (i) the relation was active in
the previous year but is no longer active and (ii), in case buyer and/or supplier were involved in
a merger or acquisition, there is no active link between the successor company or acquiror and
the buyer or supplier. The second condition rules out purely mechanically breaks in the supply
chain that could result from mergers and acquisitions. This variable is the main left-hand side
variable in the regressions in Section 3.
We set this variable to missing in a few cases to avoid other possible mechanical breaks.
If a buyer has dropped out of coverage and, in case of a merger or acquisition, the successor
company or acquiror is not covered by FactSet in the current year, then its relations are not
counted as breaking. This is to rule out that we erroneously count a link as broken purely
because a firm is no longer covered. We also count the variable as missing when the buyer and
the supplier in the given relation are integrating.
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A.2 Zephyr M&A data
We use Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database for information on mergers and acquisitions. Zephyr
records deals and rumors about deals for mergers and acquisitions in which at least a 2% stake
in the target company changes owners and the value of the deal exceeds GBP 1M. For an
overview of Zehphyr’s content, coverage, and how it compares to other M&A databases, see
Bollaert and Delanghe (2015). For the sake of brevity, we refer to any merger or acquisition
simply as merger in the following.
Matching and merging with other data sources
Zephyr reports the exact dates of rumors, announcements and (expected) completions or with-
drawals of mergers. Analogously to the FactSet data, we convert these data to a panel of
merger events, where each observation is identified by the target firm, the acquiring firm and
the calendar year of the completion date for completed mergers or the year of the rumor for
mergers that were rumored but never completed.
We match firms in the FactSet and Zephyr databases using security identifiers such as
CUSIP or ISIN, as well as ticker names wherever possible. For the remaining firms we use a
string matching tool provided by Bureau van Dijk that takes into account company names and,
where available, addresses.
Table XVII—: Types of mergers and acquisitions
Vertical Horizontal Both Unrelated Total
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Partial acquisitions 46 5.8 51 6.4 8 1.0 694 86.9 799 100.0
Full acquisitions & mergers 132 4.4 568 18.9 69 2.3 2,231 74.4 3,000 100.0
Total 178 4.7 619 16.3 77 2.0 2,925 77.0 3,799 100.0
Note: Number of partial and full mergers and acquisitions by presence vertical and horizontal relation between
the merging parties (2003-2016). Partial acquisitions exclude minority stakes.
Table XVII breaks down the mergers and acquisitions between firms in the matched sample
by the type of their relation in the FactSet Revere data. In addition to vertical mergers, the data
allow us to identify horizontal mergers (through competitor relationships) and mergers that are
both horizontal and vertical in nature. In our analyses, however, we focus on integrations that
have a vertical dimension to them.
Table XVIII reports summary statistics about buyer-supplier relations where the supplier
was vertically integrating or rumored to be vertically integrating with a competitor of the buyer.
While the buyers in both groups are quite comparable, it seems that rumors involve suppliers
that are on average somewhat larger than those suppliers which actually undergo integration.
Note that we control for these differences in our regressions and also do not find a differential
effect for larger or smaller suppliers.
35
Table XVIII—: Treated buyer-supplier relations and placebo counterparts
Vertical M&A with Comp.
Actual M&A Rumored M&A Difference
New relationships 0.10 0.14 0.04
Ending relationships 0.51 0.16 -0.35∗∗∗
Buyer’s suppliers 71.00 78.09 7.10
Supplier’s buyers 27.55 48.19 20.64∗∗∗
Buyer’s competitors 68.24 68.28 0.04
Supplier’s competitors 19.58 36.14 16.56∗∗∗
Age of relationship 3.51 3.98 0.47
Sales (log m$): Buyer 8.26 8.96 0.70∗∗
Sales (log m$): Supplier 6.92 8.77 1.86∗∗
Sales (log m$): Competitor 9.33 9.78 0.45∗∗
Log Employment: Buyer 9.23 9.84 0.61∗
Log Employment: Supplier 6.79 9.46 2.68∗∗
Log Employment: Competitor 10.32 9.86 -0.46∗
N 207 221 428
Note: Summary statistics for the buyer-supplier-years for which suppliers are involved in a vertical M&A-
transaction with a competitor of the buyer.
Key variables
With the firm network and the merger information in place, we construct our main explanatory
variables. For ease of exposition, for a given buyer-supplier-year observation, we refer to the
buyer as firm b, to the supplier as firm s and to a firm that merges with the supplier as firm c.
Supplier vertically integrates: We construct a dummy variable that is equal to one at the
buyer-supplier-year level if firm s is involved in a merger with firm c which is also a customer
of s. We restrict attention here to full mergers and acquisitions in the sense that the stake of
the acquirer after the acquisition is 100% but was either zero or unknown before. Firm s can
be either the acquirer or the target in the M&A with firm c. Note that we only count mergers
as vertical if there was an active buyer-supplier relationship between s and c in the year of
integration.
Supplier vertically integrates with buyer’s competitor: This dummy variable is equal to one
at the buyer-supplier-year level if firm s and c are merging, s is an active supplier of c in that
year and b and c have an active competitor relationship in that year.
For the placebo analyses we construct the same variables again using rumored mergers
instead of actual mergers. These rumors come from “unconfirmed reports”, which “may be
in the press, in a company press release, or elsewhere” (Bureau Van Dijk, 2017). They may
indeed come from announcements by one of the involved firm as long as the other firms have
not yet confirmed the announcements. In the Zephyr database, this corresponds to deals for
which the variable deal status is “Rumour”. The timing of these events differs slightly: instead
of the completion date (which is unavailable), we use the rumor date. In general however, there
is little time elapsing between a rumor and the completion of a deal: 145 days on average and
about 92% of rumors which turn out to be true are realized within a year. For our placebo
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analyses, we exclude all rumors that materialize within three years.
A.3 Company financials and industry classifications
To achieve best possible coverage of company financials and industry classifications for the firms
in our supply chain network, we combine data from Orbis, Compustat (through WRDS) and
FactSet Fundamentals. The combination of the various data sources is necessary in particular
because of varying coverage over time. While we have supply chain and merger information
available from 2003 to present, Orbis data is only available to us from 2007 onwards. In contrast,
Compustat and FactSet Fundamentals are available for earlier years as well.
Matching and merging with other data sources
As with the Zephyr database, we first match all firms for which securities identifiers are avail-
able. As Zephyr and Orbis share the same identifier, matching these data sources is straightfor-
ward. For the remaining firms and data sources we use the company names for string matching.
For firms where financials are available from multiple data sources, we only retain the
information from the data source that provides the longest coverage of the sales variable of that
firm. Hence, all of a given firm’s financial information always come from the same data source in
order to ensure consistency over time and across items. Wherever ties occur, preference is given
first to FactSet Fundamentals, then to Orbis. Note that the variables from several datasets are
almost perfectly correlated for the observations where we do have overlaps in coverage.
Key variables
Sales: The sales data are contained in the variables “ff sales” in FactSet Fundamentals, “sales”
in Orbis and “sale” in Compustat. Orbis reports all financials directly in USD, the sales
data from the other data sources are converted to USD where necessary using exchange rate
information included in those datasets. A few firms in the data exhibit unusual sales trajectories
that seem to suggest reporting or data entry issues. In order to rule out that our results are
driven by such observations, we exclude firms whose sales growth falls into the first or 99th
percentile in one or more years.
Employment: The number of employees is contained in the variables “ff emp” in FactSet
Fundamentals, and “emp” in Orbis and Compustat. We use these variables without further
processing.
NAICS codes: From Orbis and Compustat we can also retrieve NAICS industry codes
(“naics primary” and “naics secondary” in Orbis, “naics” in Compustat). When several NAICS
codes are available, we restrict attention to the primary one for clustering or aggregation.
A.3.1 Mutual fund capital outflow instrument
To construct the MFHS instrument, we follow Appendix C of Dessaint et al. (2016). We
construct quarterly capital net outflows of US mutual funds using the CRSP mutual funds
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data, and the hypothethical stock sales following large outflows using the funds’ portfolio data
in CDA Spectrum/Thomson. We match funds using the crosswalk provided by WRDS.
A.4 Summary statistics for vertically integrating firms
Table XIX shows summary statistics for firms that vertically integrate with one of their buyers.
The left column contains firms that integrate with non-competitors of one of their buyers, the
right column contains firms that integrate with a firm that is not in a competitor relationship
with any other buyer.
Table XIX—: Summary statistics for vertically integrating firms
No foreclosure potential Foreclosure potential
Mean SD Mean SD
# Buyers 47.81 70.72 18.51 15.29
# Suppliers 46.54 66.66 15.38 16.81
# Competitors 48.59 67.07 17.57 12.50
Log sales 15.50 2.04 – –
Log employment 9.37 2.23 – –
Observations 140 53
Note: The table presents summary statistics on suppliers that vertically integrate with a non-competitor of
the buyer (first column) or a competitor of the buyer (second column). Coverage of sales and employment is
very poor (<10%) for suppliers in vertical integrations with foreclosure potential.
B Further results
B.1 Impact of foreclosure on employment
Table XX shows the impact of a supplier integrating with a competitor on firm employment.
The OLS results are similar to sales, though somewhat smaller (about half of the percentage-
wise effect on sales) and not statistically significant. IV estimates are not significantly different
from zero either. Overall, there does not seem to be an impact of foreclosure on employment.
B.2 Direct comparison of the rumored vs actual mergers
Table XXI shows regressions with both rumored and actual integration events included. This
allows for a direct comparison of the two types of events in the same specification. While the
main coefficient of interest – the impact of an actual vertical merger of the supplier with the
buyer’s competitor – remains large and significant, the rumored counterparts of these events
have slightly negative and statistically not significant coefficients.
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Table XX—: Impact on buyer’s employment
Dependent variable: Log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supplier v.integrates 0.028∗∗ 0.009 0.029∗∗ 0.009 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor -0.014 -0.028 -0.077 -0.086 0.035
(0.053) (0.052) (0.100) (0.098) (0.184)
× log(1 + # alt. suppliers) 0.027 0.025 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.035)
Buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Observations 70983 70983 70983 70983 70983
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Note: Controls: number of customers, competitors and suppliers. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
firm level, are in parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.3 Hazard models
An alternative way to model the impact of a supplier’s vertical integration on the probability of
a buyer-supplier link breaking is in terms of a hazard model. In this framework, we can compare
the survival times of links where the supplier integrated with a competitor of the buyer to the
survival times of links where there was a vertical integration with a non-competitor. When a
link does not break during the observation period, the survival time is treated as censored.
Table XXII presents the result of a Cox proportional hazard model estimated on all buyer-
supplier links in which the supplier vertically integrated with one of its customers:
hbs(t) = h0bs(t) exp
(
β✶{s integrates vertically w. competitor of b}bs + ηb + ηt + ηi(b) + ηi(s)
)
where hbs(t) is the hazard of a buyer-supplier link breaking and ηb , ηt, ηi(b) and ηi(s) are indi-
cator variables for buyers, integration years, the buyer’s industry and the supplier’s industry
respectively. We use a partial likelihood framework that does not require to specify the baseline
hazard h0bs(t).
20 The survival time is measured from the beginning of the year of integration
to the end of the year in which the relationship broke. Columns (1) to (3) retain all integration
events, even when a given buyer-supplier link undergoes multiple vertical mergers of the sup-
plier. Columns (4) to (6) only keep the first of these events for each buyer-supplier link. We
calculate standard errors clustered among observations related to the same vertical integration
event.
The results confirm those presented in Section 3. Even after adding controls and including
buyer, year and industry dummies, a vertical relationship is expected to end 28% sooner when
20The results are similar when specifying an exponential or Weibull distribution.
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Table XXI—: Comparison of rumored and actual vertical mergers with competitor of the buyer
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3)
Supplier v. integrates 0.014 0.006 0.021
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Sup. v. integrates, rumor about competitor -0.027 -0.020 -0.038
(0.043) (0.074) (0.067)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.208∗∗ 0.199∗ 0.186∗
(0.071) (0.094) (0.082)
Controls Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.578 0.619 0.671
Observations 640708 472763 472763
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other links
of the supplier breaking. Robust standard errors clustered at the supplier-year level. The number of reported
observations is the number of non-singleton observations. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
the supplier vertically integrates with one of the buyer’s competitors compared to when vertical
integration occurs with a non-competitor of the buyer. The mean survival time of relations
is 4.3 years. While the point estimates vary slightly, the qualitative result that links threat-
ened by vertical foreclosure are substantially more short-lived is robust to choosing alternative
specifications of the model and the underlying sample.
Table XXII—: Impact of supplier’s integration with buyer’s competitor on hazard rate of buyer-
supplier link breaking
Hazard ratio of buyer-supplier link breaking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 1.445∗∗ 1.250∗ 1.283∗∗ 1.412∗∗ 1.216∗ 1.228∗
(0.120) (0.116) (0.123) (0.132) (0.115) (0.121)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer Industry dummies Yes Yes
Supplier Industry dummies Yes Yes
Events All All All First First First
R2
Observations 6934 6934 6223 5456 5456 4871
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link. Robust standard errors
clustered at the supplier-year level. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
40
B.4 Alternative relationship definitions
As an additional robustness check, we repeat the baseline regressions with an alternative defini-
tion of the buyer-supplier network. In particular one might be worried that relationships break
only temporarily and are ultimately reestablished so that the effects we attribute to vertical
foreclosure are only transitory. To address this concern, we can remove gaps from buyer buyer-
supplier relations. We count a relation as active in a given year if it has been reported active
in previous and in future years, even when it is currently not reported to be active. Here, a
link is not counted as breaking if it reforms at a later date.
Table XXIII—: Extensive margin regressions with stable buyer-supplier relations
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier v. integrates 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor 0.186∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.186∗∗
(0.046) (0.050) (0.045)
Controls Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.434 0.434 0.451 0.492
Observations 3351207 3351188 2521097 2521097
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other links
of the supplier breaking. Robust standard errors clustered at the supplier-year level. The number of reported
observations is the number of non-singleton observations. The drop in the number of observations in columns
(3) and (4) is explained by firms with missing industry codes. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure XXIII shows that the baseline results are robust to using this alternative definition.
The coefficients on the variable representing a merger of a supplier with the buyer’s competitor
remains statistically significant throughout and is even slightly larger than in the baseline
results. This means that the correlations are not driven by brief pauses in a relationship which
ultimately resumes.
B.5 Firm entry in the upstream segment?
Do vertical mergers with foreclosure potential deter entry of firms in the upstream segment? To
investigate this question we count the number of suppliers that enter an industry as measured
by three-digit NAICS cells in a given year and relate it to whether or not there has been
a potential foreclosure event in that industry. This exercise is more tentative in nature for
three main reasons: First, NAICS codes are a relatively crude measure of the upstream market
that does not account for product or geographical differentiation. Second, the industry codes
reported in our data are time invariant, meaning that we cannot capture existing firms moving
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into new product markets. Finally, as we document above, our sample consists mainly of large
firms and we may therefore not be able to detect changes in the entry patterns of small firms.
Notwithstanding these caveats, we estimate the following regression:
LogEntryit = β✶{Potential foreclosure}it + ηi + ηt + εit
where LogEntryit is defined as the log of one plus the number of suppliers in industry i that
have at least one customer in year t but did not have one the previous year.
Table XXIV reports the results of this regression. We measure potential foreclosure in two
different ways. The first approach is a dummy indicating whether a supplier in the industry had
a merger with foreclosure potential, i.e. the supplier merged with a buyer whose competitor it
also supplied (columns 1-2). The second approach is a dummy indicating that a merger with
foreclosure potential coincided with a break of the buyer-supplier link with the downstream
competitor (columns 3-4). While the estimates are quite noisy and not statistically significant,
the point-estimates are negative throughout. Perhaps foreclosure events have a negative impact
on firm entry in the upstream industry. Because of the caveats mentioned above and the fact
that estimates are not very precise, we hesitate to draw conclusions.
Table XXIV—: Firm entry and vertical integrations with foreclosure potential
Dep. var.: log(1 + #entering suppliers)it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V. integration w. foreclosure potential -0.032 -0.079
(0.111) (0.092)
× buyer-supplier link breaks -0.045 -0.110
(0.130) (0.107)
Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.891 0.891 0.926 0.926
Observations 1236 1236 1236 1236
Note: Controls: number of buyer-supplier relations and number of suppliers in a given industry-year.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.6 Relationship severance prior to integration?
We revisit the main regression presented in section 3 in order to investigate whether buyer-
supplier relations are more likely to end already in the year before the supplier vertically
integrates. If there was reverse causality for supply assurance reasons for instance, we might
expect to find a positive correlation in the year before integration actually takes place. We
repeat the baseline specification but replace the right-hand side variables by dummies that are
one if a time-t competitor of b vertically integrates with s at time t+ 1.
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Table XXV presents the results of this exercise. We find no evidence that relationships are
already more likely to break in the year preceding vertical integration. Quite to the contrary,
these relationships are substantially less likely to break. This correlation is not mechanical and
in particular persists when restricting the sample to relations with suppliers that keep at least
one customer in year t+ 1 when the integration takes place.
Table XXV—: Hazard of links breaking in year before vertical integration
Dependent variable: ✶{LinkBreaks}bst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier v. integrates in t+1 -0.031 -0.022 -0.008 0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Supplier v. integrates w. competitor in t+1 -0.186∗∗ -0.174∗∗ -0.151∗∗
(0.041) (0.043) (0.043)
Controls Yes
Relation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Buyer × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Pair × Year FE Yes Yes
R2 0.576 0.576 0.616 0.670
Observations 638681 638681 470788 470788
Note: Controls: number of upstream customers and competitors, age of the link, dummy indicating other links
of the supplier breaking. Robust standard errors clustered at the supplier-year level. The number of reported
observations is the number of non-singleton observations. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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